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Abstract 
There are continuing efforts at the monetary integration and unionization in West Africa. 
Several academics argue that a monetary union among West African states would be costly 
because of the magnitude of asymmetric shocks. A common monetary policy is inappropriate 
and ineffective to respond to divergent shocks. Therefore, the stability of such a union is 
critically dependent on risk-sharing mechanisms for achieving income insurance and 
consumption smoothing. A monetary union is still optimal if output stabilization mechanisms 
such as risk-sharing institutions, are in place to cope with asymmetric shocks. This article 
estimates risk-sharing channels among West African states from 1970 to 2004. It uses the 
definition of national accounts to measure the fraction of asymmetric output shocks smoothed 
via net factors income, net transfers and net saving. We find that compared to the OECD 
(Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) estimates, the degree of risk-
sharing among West African countries is quite low. We also obtain that net saving is the 
significant and stable risk-sharing channel. A further analysis shows that only the contribution 
of public saving is significant. 
JEL codes: E2, E6, F3. 
Keywords: Asymmetric shocks, Interstates Risk-sharing, West Africa. 
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1 Introduction 
In 2000, the ECOWAS (Economic Community of Western African States) member states 
declared their intention to accelerate the economic integration of the region. They decided to 
create a second monetary zone, the WAMZ (West African Monetary Zone) in addition to the 
WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union). At the final stage, the WAMZ and 
the WAEMU will merge so as to have a single currency for all ECOWAS states around 
2020.2 The monetary union arrangement is perceived by West African policymakers as a 
possible way to get sound macroeconomic policies and sustained economic growth for the 
entire region. 
The suitability of a monetary union among West African states was discussed by several 
academics. A consensus has emerged suggesting that shocks affecting West African states are 
mostly country-specific shocks i.e. asymmetric. According to the theory of Optimal Currency 
Areas (OCA), the principal requirement for sharing a common currency is the symmetry of 
shocks (i.e. shocks affecting similarly countries)3. A common monetary policy and a common 
exchange rate policy are inappropriate and inefficient if shocks experienced by member states 
are different. 
Opposite to this main stream, there are some contributions in the literature of monetary unions 
proposing that the symmetry of shocks is not the strict condition for sharing a common 
monetary policy and a common currency (e.g. Asdrubali et al., 1996 and Sorensen and Yosha, 
1998). When asymmetric shocks are important, the stability of monetary unions is critically 
dependent on mechanisms for achieving income insurance and consumption smoothing. 
Especially during recessions, countries may be provided with the incentive to leave the union 
if mechanisms for smoothing consumption are absent and supranational fiscal institutions 
cannot provide cross-country income insurance through tax-transfers or grant allocations to 
                                                           
2
 The prospect of a single currency for all West African states had been formalized in the ECOWAS treaty 
signed in 1975. The chapter IX of the treaty is entitled “Establishment and Completion of an Economic and 
Monetary Union”. 
3
 The theory of optimum currency areas (OCA) compares the costs and the benefits of entering or forming a 
common currency area. The OCA theory can be considered as a tool for answering the question on “how to 
choose the optimum exchange rate regime?”. The OCA theory outlines that the key requirement for suitable 
monetary unions is the symmetry of shocks, i.e., shocks that affect countries similarly. The similarity of shocks 
offsets the costs induced by the delegation of the monetary policy and the exchange rate policy to a regional 
central bank, which has a regional objective rather than a country-specific target. 
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such governments in need. These conditions make the criterion for symmetric shocks less 
necessary for the formation and stability of a monetary union. Therefore, a monetary union 
could be optimal if output stabilization mechanisms such as risk-sharing institutions are in 
place to cope with asymmetric shocks. When risk-sharing mechanisms are perfect, domestic 
consumption only depends on aggregate resources, regardless of any asymmetric shock 
(Obstfeld, 1994). 
This article sheds lights on the channels among West African states from 1970 to 2004. We 
use the definition of national accounts to measure the fraction of asymmetric output shocks 
smoothed via net factors income, net transfers and net saving. The contributions of net factors 
income, net saving and net transfers respectively indicate the degree of risk-sharing achieved 
through regional factors markets, through regional credit markets and regional fiscal transfer 
system. We find that compared to the OECD (Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development) estimates, the degree of risk-sharing among West African countries is quite 
low. We also obtain that net saving is the significant and stable risk-sharing channel. A further 
analysis shows that only the contribution of public saving is significant. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. The second section presents the background of 
the study. Section 3 describes the methodology of the decomposition of the cross-sectional 
variance of the GDP growth. Section 4 presents and discusses the empirical results. The last 
section concludes by providing some policies recommendations. 
 
2 The background 
2.1 West African monetary systems 
The actual monetary systems in West Africa are the result of choices made immediately after 
the political independences (see Table 1). Most of the British colonies created their own 
currency whereas the French colonies established the West African Monetary Union 
(WAMU). 
The WAMU comprises Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Côte d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, 
Senegal and Togo. Togo joined the WAMU in 1963, Mali left in 1962 and rejoined in 1984, 
Mauritania left in 1973 and Guinea Bissau integrated the union in 1997. The members of the 
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WAMU also signed a pegging treaty with France that guarantees the unlimited convertibility 
of their currency. In compensation, the central bank of the union has to pool reserves at the 
union level - except sums which are necessary to their current treasury and those relating to 
their transactions with IMF - and has to deposit at least 50% of these reserves in an account 
(compte d’opérations), held by French treasury. In 1994 after the unique devaluation of the 
union, the member states expanded the monetary union agreement to an economic and 
monetary union, called WAEMU (West African Economic and Monetary Union). 
Since 1975, the WAEMU member states created with seven others West African states (Cape 
Verde, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Conakry, Liberia, Nigeria and Sierra Leone) the Economic 
Community of Western African States (ECOWAS). The ECOWAS envisions the promotion 
of the economic and political integration of West African states. 
In 2000, ECOWAS countries decided to foster their monetary integration. The Accra summit 
launches the principles of a second monetary zone, the WAMZ (West African Monetary 
Zone) in addition to the WAEMU. The WAMZ groups Gambia, Ghana, Guinea Conakry, 
Nigeria and Sierra Leone. These countries have scheduled the introduction of a common 
currency in 2003. At the final stage, the WAMZ and the WAEMU will merge so as to have a 
single currency for all ECOWAS states. Due to difficulties to fulfil the convergence criteria, 
the introduction of the common currency in the zone was postponed several times (July 2005 
and December 2009). The actual climate is the proposition of a new deadline for 2012. 
 
Table 1: Actual West African monetary arrangements 
 
 CFA Zone   
ECOWAS 
WAEMU: Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Mali, Niger, Senegal, 
Togo 
WAMZ: Gambia, 
Ghana, Guinea 
Conakry, Nigeria 
and Sierra Leone 
Others: Cape 
Verde, Liberia, 
Mauritania (left 
in 2000) 
 
Note: ECOWAS sets for Economic Community of Western African States; WAEMU for 
West African Economic and Monetary Union, WAMZ for West African Monetary Zone. 
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2.2 Is there a suitable West African monetary union? 
The suitability of a monetary union among West African states is not particularly strong. 
Countries in the region are differently specialized in one or two primary products. The 
specialization pattern hinges on the geography of countries. For instance, Sahelian economies 
(Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger) are essentially agricultural and submitted to frequent climatic 
shocks. Senegal, Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire have a more diversified and developed industrial 
structures. Benin and Togo form a third group where the import-export activity is 
predominant. Finally, Nigeria is totally different from the rest of ECOWAS by being largely 
dependent on crude oil exports. Because of differences in productions and exports, West 
African countries are subject to important asymmetric shocks. 
Empirically, there is evidence that West African states do not have sufficient symmetry to 
meet this criterion (Fielding and Shields, 2001, Bénassy-Quéré and Coupet, 2005 and 
Tsangarides and Qureshi, 2006, Houssa, 2008). Fielding and Shields (2001) use the technique 
of structural vector auto-regressive (VAR) to analyze the correlation of output shocks and the 
correlation of price shocks within the CFA monetary unions. They find that price shocks are 
highly correlated whereas output shocks rarely co-moved. Houssa (2008) applies a dynamic 
structural factor model which solves some limits of the VAR methodology and finds similar 
conclusions for West African countries. Using cluster analyses, Bénassy-Quéré and Coupet 
(2005) and Tsangarides and Qureshi (2006) also find a significant lack of homogeneity among 
West African states. Overall, the assessment of the optimality of monetary union among West 
African countries is negative. 
However, a monetary union is still optimal if member states are able to share output risks. 
This was the focus of Mundell in his seminal article “A Theory of Optimal Currency Areas” 
in 1961. In introducing the concept of OCA, Mundell discussed the role of labour mobility as 
a stabilization mechanism in monetary union. If a country is able to share output risks with its 
partners in a monetary union, this regime could solve other rigidities in the area. Risk-sharing 
mechanisms mitigate the negative effects of asymmetric shocks by smoothing domestic 
consumption. A risk-sharing arrangement allows financial transfers from booming economies 
towards partners in recession. For illustration, in a pooling group, a country experiencing a 
temporary commodity boom can lend the extra revenue to partners in recession through 
budgetary transfers or regional credit markets. When risk-sharing mechanisms are perfect, 
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domestic consumption only depends on aggregate resources, regardless of any asymmetric 
shock. 
 
2.3 A brief literature review 
The topic of risk-sharing was developed for industrial countries and has been ignored for 
Africa. 
Asdrubali et al. (1996) was the first to introduce the methodology of the assessment of 
interstates risk-sharing. They show that find that in the case of the United States of America, 
financial markets play a much larger role than the federal government transfers as channels of 
interstate risk sharing. They obtain that 39% of shocks to GDP are smoothed by capital 
markets, 13% by transfers from the federal government and 23% by credit markets. The 
amount of interstate risk-sharing not smoothed is only 25% of shocks to gross domestic 
product. Sorensen and Yosha (1998) extend the methodology of Asdrubali et al. (1996) in 
order to analyze channels of risk sharing among OECD and EMU (European Monetary 
Union) countries. They find that, for OECD as well as for EMU countries, about 40 percent of 
shocks to GDP are smoothed, with about half the smoothing achieved through national 
government budget deficits and half by corporate saving. Finally, Marinheiro (2005) analyses 
the smoothing of asymmetric shocks to output for the euro area. He examines whether the 
private capital markets is able to replace the government in providing output smoothing in the 
euro-area. As Sorensen and Yosha (1998), he finds no evidence of large differences in the 
patterns of risk sharing for the OECD countries and euro-area countries. 
The issue of risk-sharing has been marginalized in the literature for African countries. To the 
best of our knowledge, Yehoue (2005) is the unique article on risk-sharing among African 
states. He focuses on risk-sharing within the two monetary unions of the CFA zone and finds 
that the French aid and the contributions of the central banks play an important role in the 
stabilization of domestic consumptions. The aim of the present paper is to contribute to fill 
this gap in the literature. I analyze here the special case of West African states in the 
perspective of the future monetary union. I estimate the channels of risk-sharing among West 
African countries.  
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3 Methodology 
The methodology applied in this study uses the definition of national accounts to decompose 
the cross-sectional variance of output growth. The decomposition allows the estimate of 
channels through which asymmetric shocks are pooled among a group of countries. 
 
3.1 Risk-sharing channels 
Risk-sharing mechanisms are formal or informal institutions that help consumption smoothing 
by allowing “payments” from booming economies towards recession countries. In national 
accounts, there are three major flows measuring such “payments”: factor income, net transfers 
and net saving. 
The first risk-sharing channel takes place on factor markets. Income earned from capital 
invested abroad or income earned by citizens working abroad may contribute to interstate 
risk-sharing. For example if capital is mobile, citizens could smooth their consumption by 
acquiring financial assets in partner countries. By the same token, in the context of labour 
mobility, residents in recession countries can temporary work in booming partners and 
smooth their consumption. In national accounts, net factor income is recorded as the sum of 
net capital income and net labour income. This corresponds to the discrepancy between Gross 
National Product (GNP) and GDP. 
The second channel is a “tax-transfer” system through net transfers. Interstate transfers may 
participate in the stabilization of asymmetric shocks if they move from booming countries 
towards the recession economies. In national accounts, the gap between Disposable National 
Income (DNI) and GNP denotes net transfers. 
The last channel is net saving. It represents the contribution of international credit markets in 
risk-sharing. Citizens, corporations and governments may adjust their savings in response to 
shocks affecting their incomes by accumulating during expansion periods and dis-saving 
during recession periods. This adjustment consequently copes with both symmetric and 
asymmetric shocks. Particularly, if asymmetric shocks are important, countries would 
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optimally choose to share risks and smooth their consumption via saving. For example a 
booming country can lend on international or regional credit markets its extra saving to a 
partner country in recession. In national accounts, net saving is the difference between DNI 
and domestic consumption. 
The next subsection describes the decomposition of the cross-sectional variance of GDP 
growth. It estimates the risk-sharing channels above-mentioned. 
 
3.2 Variance decomposition 
The methodology of the decomposition of the cross-sectional variance of GDP growth was 
introduced by Asdrubali et al. (1996) and extended by Sorensen and Yosha (1998). It assumes 
that shocks to output are exogenous from risk-sharing processes. From output to consumption, 
the following chain equation can be defined: 
i
ti
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
t
i
ti
t CC
DNI
DNI
NI
NI
GNP
GNP
GDPGDP ∗∗∗∗=        (1) 
GDP denotes the Gross Domestic Product, GNP the Gross National Product, NI the National 
Income, DNI the Disposable National Income and C the total consumption. These aggregates 
are defined as follows: 
GNP = GDP + Net factor income, 
NI = GNP – Capital depreciation, 
DNI = NI + Net transfers, 
C = DNI – Net saving 
At first glance, equation (1) provides insights into channels through which consumption is 
stabilized by smoothing out GDP shocks. After an exogenous GDP shock, stabilization is 
achieved through the adjustment of net factors income if GNP remains unchanged. By the 
same token, if GNP varies and NI remains constant after a shock, then stabilization of output 
shocks is achieved through the depreciation of capital. If NI varies and DNI remains constant 
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after a shock, then stabilization of output shocks is achieved through the adjustment of net 
transfers. Likewise, if DNI varies whereas consumption is constant, stabilization is obtained 
via the adjustment of net saving. Finally, shocks are not totally stabilized if total consumption 
fluctuates. 
A decomposition of output growth can be obtained by taking the logarithms and the first-
differences of equation (1): 
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From equation (2), the variance of GDP growth is computed as follows: 
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where Cov denotes the covariance defined by )()(*)(),( XYEYEXEYXCov −= 4. The 
division of both sides of equation (3) by the by the variance of GDP growth ][ itLogGDPV ∆
 
leads to the following result: 
                                                           
4
 In order to compute the variance of output growth from equation (2), I need to compute the difference between 
])LogGDP[(E 2it∆  and 2it ]LogGDP[E ∆ . First, I multiply and factorize both sides of equation (2) by 
i
tLogGDP∆  and after then I compute the mathematical expectation of the result. Second, I compute the 
mathematical expectation of equation (2) and multiply the outcome by ]LogGDP[E it∆ . 
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And under the subsequent notations: 
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Equation (4) is equivalent to usdf1 βββββ τ ++++= . fβ  is the slope of the Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) regression of )( itit LogGNPLogGDP ∆−∆  on itLogGDP∆ . dβ  corresponds to 
the OLS regression of )LogNILogGNP( itit ∆∆ −  on itLogGDP∆ , τβ  to the OLS regression of 
)LogDNILogNI( itit ∆∆ −  on itLogGDP∆ , sβ  to the OLS regression of 
)( itit LogCLogDNI ∆−∆  on itLogGDP∆  and uβ  to the regression of itLogC∆  on itLogGDP∆
 
(the β  slope of the OLS regression of variables Y on X is defined as )(
),(
XV
YXCov
=β ). The 
β -coefficients are, in that case, interpreted as measures of incremental percentages of GDP 
shocks stabilized at each level of the decomposition aforementioned. Thereby the coefficients 
fβ , dβ , τβ , sβ  respectively denote the incremental percentage of output shocks 
compensated by net factors income, capital depreciation, net transfers and net saving. In 
principle, the β -coefficients could be either positive or negative. A positive coefficient would 
indicate a stabilization channel whereas a negative one would imply a destabilization channel. 
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It is possible to calculate the β -coefficients for each country and each year. However, in the 
present work we are interested in average coefficients for a group of country during a given 
period and in the response to asymmetric. Therefore, the β -coefficients
 
are estimated through 
a panel system by including year-specific dummies. The year-specific dummies capture the 
aggregate component in GDP growth rates (i.e., the symmetric shocks) and allows the 
interpretation of the β -coefficients as the incremental percentages of asymmetric shocks 
stabilized at each level of the decomposition aforementioned. Thereby fβ , τβ , sβ  are the 
incremental percentage of asymmetric shocks respectively stabilized through net factors 
income, net transfers and net saving. 
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The tv.,  are year-specific dummies and the i te.,  denote the error terms. Intuitively, if a country 
experiences an exogenous drop in its GDP by 5% whereas its GNP falls only by 3%, then net 
factor income contribute to stabilize 40% of shocks. Therefore the corresponding coefficient 
fβ  estimated in the system (5) is 0.4. The coefficient uβ  gives the proportion of shocks that 
are not stabilized. 
The system (5) is estimated with the method of Generalized Least Squares (GLS) in two-
steps. The first step uses the clustering technique to correct the heteroskedasticity. It also uses 
the procedure of Cochrane-Orcutt to correct the potential autocorrelation in the residuals. In 
doing so, we assume for each country that the error terms follow an AR (1) process. The 
second step applies the OLS estimates. The OLS estimates are in this case equivalent to the 
Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) technique because all equations in the system have 
the same covariate. Finally, we do not constraint the β -coefficients. Therefore, the 
coefficients could be larger than 1 or negative. 
The methodology of variance decomposition was criticized in the literature (e.g. Mélitz and 
Zùmer 1999, Bayoumi 1999). The methodology assumes that the GDP shocks are exogenous 
vis-à-vis the risk-sharing processes. If this statement does not hold, there is a simultaneity bias 
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and the OLS estimate of structural coefficients of the system (5) is not robust. Mélitz and 
Zùmer 1999 use the technique of instrumental variables on the Asdrubali et al.’s (1996) 
dataset and conclude that results do not significantly change. Furthermore, the methodology 
of variance decomposition does not address the issue of differences in countries sizes. It is 
difficult for small countries in expansion to compensate large countries in recession. In this 
context, a risk-sharing arrangement is unsustainable. The correction of heteroskedasticity and 
the use of per capita data reduce this problem in estimates. Nonetheless these drawbacks the 
advantage of the methodology variance decomposition is the joint examination of the 
respective contribution of factors markets, net transfers and credit markets in interstate risk-
sharing. 
We collect from the World Development Indicators 2006, annual data on GDP, GNP, 
domestic consumption (C), gross national saving (S) and capital consumption as a percentage 
of GNP. We also use from the World Bank African Database 2005, annual data on gross 
national private saving and gross national public saving. All data are expressed in real terms 
i.e. in 2000 US dollars. When the real value is unavailable, we use the GDP in constant local 
currencies, the GDP in current U.S. Dollars and the GDP in constant U.S. Dollars as 
conversion factors. Data are also measured data in per capita terms. When the per capita term 
is unavailable, we divide it by the midyear population. The dataset covers the fifteen West 
African states from 1970 to 2004. Because of the lack of data, the dataset is an unbalanced 
panel dataset5. The correction of heteroskedasticity by country accounts for this limit. 
 
4 Empirical analysis 
4.1 Results 
We estimate the panel system (5) for West African countries. Results are reported in Table 2. 
The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100 and rounded so as we are able 
to compare our estimates to the related literature. We find that risk-sharing achieved among 
West African states is low. In Table 2, the proportions of unsmoothed asymmetric shocks are 
                                                           
5
 Countries in the sample are Benin (1970-2004), Burkina Faso (1970-2004), Cape Verde (1986-2004), Côte 
d'Ivoire (1970-2004), Gambia (1970-2004), Ghana (1970-2004), Guinea Conakry (1986-2004), Guinea Bissau 
(1970-2004), Liberia (1970-2004), Mali (1970-2004), Mauritania (1970-2004), Niger (1970-2004), Nigeria 
(1970-2004), Senegal (1970-2004), Sierra Leone (1970-2004), Togo (1970-2004). 
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about 76% within the ECOWAS and the WAEMU. Surprising the estimate is better among 
WAMZ countries. They only fail to share about 67% of asymmetric shocks. The estimated 
coefficients are robust at 1%. Our results also suggest that risk-sharing through net factor 
income, capital depreciation and net transfers are absent. Net factor income tends to 
destabilize output in the ECOWAS and the WAMZ economies. Similarly, capital depreciation 
is not a smoothing channel of asymmetric shocks with the three zones analyzed. 
Exceptionally, net transfers help to significantly absorb about 29% of asymmetric shocks. 
Most important, the significant and stable risk-sharing channel among West African is net 
saving. It contributes to cope with 21% of asymmetric shocks within the three zone of 
interest. This represents around 90% (21/76) of smoothed shocks within ECOWAS and 
WAEMU and 70% (21/70) within the WAMZ. 
 
Table 2: Risk-sharing channels against asymmetric shocks in West 
Africa (1970-2004) 
 [1] [2] [3] 
 ECOWAS WAEMU WAMZ 
Net factor income -2 0 -2 
 (2) (1) (4) 
Capital depreciation 0 1 -1 
 (1) (1) (3) 
Net transfers 5 -1 29* 
 (6) (7) (17) 
Saving 21*** 21*** 21* 
 (5) (6) (13) 
Unsmoothed 76*** 76*** 67*** 
 (6) (6.86) (17) 
F test on year dummies Significant Significant Significant 
Observations 472 224 149 
Notes: Two-steps GLS estimates based on system (5). Robust standards errors 
in parentheses. The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100 
and rounded. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 
1%. 
 
These finding can be extended to all types of fluctuations both asymmetric and symmetric 
shocks. Results remain unchanged when the system (5) is estimated without year dummies. In 
Table 3 the fractions of unsmoothed shocks are still important (between 68 and 80% of 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.02 
 
15 
 
shocks) and net saving is still the significant smoothing channel (between 21% and 32% of 
shocks). The contributions of net factor income, capital depreciation and net transfers are not 
statistically robust. 
 
Table 3: Output stabilization channels against all shocks in West Africa 
(1970-2004) 
 [1] [2] [3] 
 ECOWAS WAEMU WAMZ 
Net factor income -2 -1 -1 
 (2) (1) (4) 
Capital depreciation 0 0 -1 
 (1) (1) (3) 
Net transfers 0 -1 11 
 (6) (6) (15) 
Saving 22*** 21*** 32*** 
 (5) (6) (11) 
Unsmoothed 81*** 79*** 69*** 
 (6) (6) (14) 
Observations 472 224 149 
Notes: Two-steps GLS estimates based on system (5). Robust standards errors 
in parentheses. The coefficients and the standard errors are multiplied by 100 
and rounded. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Because our estimates clearly indicate that it is the key risk-sharing channel, we analyze in 
depth the contribution of net saving. From an income perspective, net saving is the sum of 
public saving and private saving. The regulation of private saving and public saving are 
different. Actions and rules on financial markets are effective for private saving whereas 
fiscal rules are necessary for public saving. The comparison of the respective contributions of 
private and public saving would then prioritize policy actions. 
From the fourth equation of the system (5), the contributions of the public saving and the 
private saving in risk-sharing are estimated through the following equations: 
i
tg
i
t
g
stg
i
t
i
t
i
t eLogGDPvSgDNILogLogDNI ,,)( +∗+=−∆−∆ β     (6a) 
i
tp
i
t
p
stp
i
t
i
t
i
t eLogGDPvSpDNILogLogDNI ,,)( +∗+=−∆−∆ β     (6b) 
CERDI, Etudes et Documents, E 2010.02 
 
16 
 
i
tSg  and 
i
tSp  respectively denotes public saving and private saving. tgv ,  and tpv ,  are time 
fixed effects and catch the effect of aggregate shocks.6 Because of the control of aggregate 
shocks, the coefficient gsβ  and psβ are interpreted as the proportions of asymmetric shocks 
smoothed through public saving and private saving. We estimate equations (6a) and (6b) with 
the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) in two-steps described above. Estimates are presented in 
Table 4. The channel of public net saving is significant. It helps to cope with 12% of 
asymmetric shocks within the ECOWAS and 20% with the WAEMU. Contrasting, the 
contribution of private net saving is not statistically significant within the two zones. 
Estimates for WAMZ countries are not relevant because of the lack of data. 
 
Table 4: Risk-sharing channels in West Africa: public saving and 
private saving (1970-2004) 
 ECOWAS WAEMU WAMZ 
Public saving 12** 20*** -2 
 (5) (5) (2) 
Private saving 1 -3 9 
 (6) (6) (6) 
F test on year dummies Significant Significant Significant 
Observations 226 127 43 
Notes: Two-steps GLS estimates based equations (6a) and (6b). Robust 
standards errors in parentheses. The coefficients and the standard errors 
are multiplied by 100 and rounded. * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
In summary, risk-sharing among West African states is quite low. The small smoothing 
observed is achieved via the channel of net saving and mainly through the adjustment of 
public net saving. 
 
 
                                                           
6
 A similar decomposition is proposed by Marinheiro (2005, p. 201) for public and private saving of OECD 
countries, and by Sorensen and Yosha (1998, p. 234). 
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4.2 Discussion 
In this section, we discuss the relevance of West African risk-sharing estimated. We compare 
our estimates to the literature on industrial countries, discuss the reality of West African 
results and provide explanations of the contribution of public sector in risk-sharing. 
First, we benchmark the significance of baseline estimates in the related literature in Table 5. 
For the sake of brevity, we compare our results to the Sorensen and Yosha’s (1998) and 
Marinheiro’s (2005) findings on the OECD countries (see Sorensen and Yosha, 1998, Table 
1, Column 4, p. 226 and Marinheiro, 2005, Table 2, Column 1, p. 199). The proportion of 
asymmetric shocks that are unsmoothed among West African states (76%) is relatively high. 
Sorensen and Yosha (1998) and Marinheiro (2005) estimate smaller fractions for OECD 
states: between 59% (period 1981-90) and 65% (period 1970-99). These authors also find that 
net saving. Its contribution is much sizeable among OECD states: between 40% (period 1981-
90) and 50% (period 1970-99). Finally, similar to our estimates, net factors income and net 
transfers are not significant smoothing channels among OECD states. We then conclude that 
risk-sharing patterns are not different from those observed among industrial countries. Only 
the degree and the contribution of net saving are different. 
Second, our estimates of risk-sharing among West African countries are consistent with the 
realities of economies. First, the low contribution of net factor income is due the lack of 
labour and capital mobility in West Africa. Adjustment through factor mobility is limited by 
an important inequality in economic sizes and development between countries. Although 
important, migration flows are mainly from small and poor states toward rich countries and 
often create ethnic tensions in recipient countries. On institutional grounds, the ECOWAS 
countries introduce in 2000 a community passport so as to ease mobility of citizens. The point 
c of the article 4 in the WAEMU treaty foresees the free mobility of people, capital and liberal 
professionals. Second, interstate transfers are absent or inappropriate in the region. For 
instance, the interstate fund created by the WAEMU members in February 1998 was designed 
for structural issues such as regional disparities instead of coping with temporary shocks 
(Guillaumont Jeanneney, 2004). It mainly finances investments in regional infrastructures. In 
the WAMZ project, it is scheduled to launch a stabilization fund to allow members to face 
balance of payments shocks (Asante and Masson 2001). And finally, the relative low degree 
of risk-sharing achieved via net saving among West African states corroborates the illiquidity 
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and the weakness of financial integration in the region. For instance there are no more than 
three stock markets in the region: WAEMU stock exchange (Bourse Régionale des Valeurs 
Mobilières), Ghana stock exchange and Nigeria stock exchange. 
Third, the difference between the contributions of private sector and public sector is related to 
a wider factor specific to African countries. Private sectors in these countries have difficulties 
to obtain formal credit on domestic, regional or international markets. Moral hazard, 
repudiation risk and the lack of collaterals reduce the likelihood for citizens and corporations 
to obtain a formal bank credit (e.g. Christensen, 2004 and Sacerdoti, 2005). Conversely, fiscal 
authorities have more facility to benefit from domestic or international credits in the case of 
negative asymmetric shocks or to lend its surplus on domestic or international credit markets 
after a positive asymmetric shock. 
 
Table 5: Benchmark with literature 
 Sorensen and Yosha (1998) 
(a) 
Marinheiro (2005) (b) 
 OECD 1981-1990 OECD 1970-1999 
 Table 1, column 4 (p. 226) Table 2, column 1 (p. 
199) 
 [1] [3] 
Net factor income -2** -2 
 (1) (1) 
Capital depreciation -9*** -7*** 
 (2) (7) 
Net transfers 3*** -1 
 (1) (1) 
Saving 44*** 50*** 
 (4) (15) 
Unsmoothed 65*** 59*** 
 (4) (20) 
Notes: Two-steps GLS estimates based on system (5). Year dummies are 
included. Robust standards errors in parentheses. The coefficients and the 
standard errors are multiplied by 100 and rounded. * significant at 10%; ** 
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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5 Conclusion 
Achieving a monetary union is an official goal of the ECOWAS treaty. In 2000, the leaders of 
the region declared their intention to work for a second monetary zone (WAMZ) that will 
merge with the actual monetary union WAEMU. Several authors have shown that the 
principal requirement for sharing common currency and common monetary policy (i.e. the 
symmetry of shocks) is not particularly strong among West African states. Sharing a common 
monetary policy would be inefficient and costly for West African states. However, their 
approach is limited since a monetary union could be optimal if output stabilization 
arrangements such as risk-sharing institutions are in place to cope with asymmetric shocks. 
Risk-sharing mechanisms aim at the smoothing of domestic consumption by allowing 
“payments” from booming economies towards partners in recession. In this article, we 
analyze risk-sharing channels among West African states. We use the definition of national 
accounts to decompose the cross-sectional variance of GDP growth. We are able to estimate 
the fraction of output growth smoothed through net factors income (factors market), net 
transfers (tax-transfer system) and net saving (credit market). 
Our analyses indicate that compared to OECD countries the degree of risk-sharing achieved 
among West African states is quite low. The significant and stable risk-sharing channel is net 
saving. A detailed investigation shows that smoothing via net saving is a public sector 
contribution. These findings suggest that a monetary union among West African states would 
be less costly if countries first develop regional credit markets or facilitate access to 
international credit market. Since public saving has an important contribution in interstate 
output stabilization, national fiscal authorities might support this agenda by being important 
actors on regional credits markets. For example, governments can issue short-term bonds on 
regional credit markets in the event of negative asymmetric shocks or acquire financial assets 
when the shocks are positive. They could also create incentives to access to international 
credit markets. Further, West African must care about factors mobility and the design of 
compensation funds so as to alleviate the negative effects of asymmetric shocks and reinforce 
the contribution of regional credit markets. 
The conclusion of this article is as follows. Future West African monetary union can partly 
stabilize asymmetric shocks by developing regional credit with an active participation of 
national fiscal authorities. 
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